Abstract-Network services often exhibit positive and negative externalities that affect users' adoption decisions. One such service is "user-provided connectivity" or UPC. The service offers an alternative to traditional infrastructure-based communication services by allowing users to share their "home base" connectivity with other users, thereby increasing their access to connectivity. More users means more connectivity alternatives, i.e., a positive externality, but also greater odds of having to share one's own connectivity, i.e., a negative externality. The tug of war between positive and negative externalities together with the fact that they often depend not just on how many but also which users adopt make it difficult to predict the service's eventual success. Exploring this issue is the focus of this paper, which investigates not only when and why such services may be viable, but also explores how pricing can be used to effectively and practically realize them.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE is no denying that we are a networked society, and many networked goods or services exhibit strong externalities, i.e., a change-positive or negative-in the value of one unit of good, as more people use those goods. For example, Metcalfe's law [1, p. 71] captures the positive effect on a network value of having more users, while the increased congestion that arises from the added traffic contributes a negative externality. Externalities, and more generally the benefits derived from goods or services, vary across users, i.e., exhibit heterogeneity. This makes predicting the impact of externalities difficult, especially when positive and negative forces interact. A basic question of interest is then to determine (ahead of time) if and how offerings of goods or services that exhibit positive and negative externalities will succeed or fail.
The original motivation for this paper was answering this question for a specific service, namely, user provided connectivity or UPC. The goal of UPC is to address the rising thirst for ubiquitous data connectivity fueled by the fast growing number of capable and versatile mobile devices. This growth has taxed the communication infrastructure of wireless carriers to the point where it is threatening their continued success [2] . Addressing this issue calls for either upgrading the infrastructure, Manuscript Under a UPC scheme, connectivity grows "organically" as more users join the network and improve its coverage, and the challenge is to determine if it can reach sufficient critical mass to be viable. Consider for example a FON-like service starting with no users. This makes the service unattractive to users that value ubiquitous connectivity highly, e.g., users that roam frequently, because the limited coverage offers little connectivity beyond that of a user's "home base." On the other hand, sedentary users are mostly insensitive to the initial minimal coverage and, if the price is low enough, can derive positive utility from the service, hence join. If enough such (sedentary) users join, coverage may increase past a point where it becomes attractive to roaming users who will start joining. This would then ensure rapid growth of the service, were it not for a negative dimension to that growth.
Specifically, as more roaming users join, they compete for connectivity and may encounter increasingly congested access points. Conversely, sedentary users end up having to share their home access more frequently. This may be sufficient to convince them to drop the service (unlike roaming users, they do not see much added value from the better coverage). The resulting reduction in coverage would in turn affect roaming users, who could then also start leaving. Hence, after an initial period of growth, the service may experience a decline.
The extent to which such behaviors arise depends on many factors, and in particular the tradeoff between service cost and users' sensitivity to the positive and negative aspects of a growing user base. Making the service "free" would clearly maximize adoption, but unless other revenue sources are available, e.g., ads, is unlikely to allow it to be viable. Increasing the service price could affect (lower) adoption, but may improve its viability. More generally, service pricing offers a "control knob" that can be used to realize a variety of objectives, e.g., maximizing overall value or welfare, or maximizing provider's profit, etc. This control knob can be complex and involve offering the service at a different price to each user, i.e., discriminatory pricing [4] , or very basic, e.g., fixed pricing, and there is typically a tradeoff between how well objectives can be met and the complexity of the control (pricing) used to meet them. This paper develops a simple model that helps understand how these factors interact and affect the adoption of a UPC service and the welfare (sum of users' utility and provider's profit) it creates, and how that welfare can be efficiently distributed between users and the service provider. To maintain analytical tractability, the model makes a series of simplifying assumptions, many of which may arguably not hold in practice. However, the analysis affords insight that, as we demonstrate, remains valid even under more general settings. Specifically, the paper's main contributions consist of the following:
• formulating and solving a simple model that captures key features of a UPC type of service; • characterizing when and how the service's total welfare, or value, is maximized; • identifying practical pricing policies that realize a different tradeoff between optimizing welfare and distributing it between stakeholders; • numerically validating the robustness of the findings, when relaxing the simplifying assumptions on which the model relies. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the model we rely on to capture the properties of a UPC service. Section III explores when and how the service value (total welfare) is maximized. Section IV introduces the role of pricing in realizing different goals for the service, with subsequent sections dedicated to specific pricing policies, i.e., usage-based (Section V), hybrid (Section VI), and fixed-price (Section VII). Section VIII discusses generalizations and robustness of the findings. Related works are reviewed in Section IX, before summarizing the paper's findings in Section X.
II. MODEL FORMULATION
This section introduces a model that captures key aspects of adoption of a UPC-like service by users. We first present the general form of the model in Section II-A. We then introduce a series of simplifying assumptions in Section II-B to obtain a simpler model that is analytically tractable. Verifying that the findings afforded by this simplified model remain valid in more general situations calls for a two-prong approach: 1) an explicit solution is developed that offers a qualitative understanding of and insight into what drives the success (or failure) of UPC systems; 2) the robustness of those findings is then numerically tested under configurations that emulate more general settings, i.e., where the model's simplifying assumptions are relaxed and errors are present in the estimation of its parameters.
A. General Form
Given the expected organic growth of a UPC service, the interplay between the coverage it realizes and its ability to attract more users is of primary interest. The service coverage depends on the level of adoption in the target user population and determines the odds that users can obtain connectivity through the service while roaming. Users are heterogeneous in their propensity to roam, as captured through a variable . A user's exact value is private information, but its distribution (over the user population) is known. A low indicates a sedentary user, while a high corresponds to a user that frequently roams. Hence, determines a user's sensitivity to service coverage.
As is commonly done [5] , a user's service adoption decision is based on the utility she derives from the service; she decides to adopt if that utility is positive. A user's utility is denoted as , where is the roaming propensity of the user herself, and identifies the current set of adopters. The general form of is given as (1) where is the volume of roaming traffic generated by the current set of adopters . reflects the overall utility of connectivity, either at home or roaming, while accounts for the negative impact of roaming traffic. Finally, is the price charged to the user when the adopters' set is .
Note that the price is a control parameter that affects service adoption, i.e., it can be endogenized to achieve specific objectives. In the paper, we explore the use of pricing to maximize total welfare and/or profit. Other parameters are exogenous and can be estimated, e.g., using techniques from marketing research as discussed in [6] , but not controlled.
Building on (1), users adopt the service only if their utility is positive, and are myopic when evaluating the utility they expect to derive from the service, i.e., they do not anticipate the impact of their own decision on other users' adoption decisions. However, adoption levels affect coverage, and as coverage changes, so does an individual user's utility and, therefore, her adoption decision.
The level of adoption is given by where is a density function and reflects the distribution of roaming characteristics over the user population.
In Section II-B, we specialize the different terms in the utility function of (1).
B. Assumptions and the Simplified Model
For analytical tractability, we make several assumptions regarding the form and range of the parameters of (1) (Section VIII explores the impact of relaxing these assumptions).
First, a user's propensity to roam, as measured by , is taken to be uniformly distributed in , i.e.,
This implies that given a set of adopters , the adoption level is
Conversely, assuming that every user contributes one unit of traffic, the volume of roaming traffic generated by current adopters is given by (3) Next, we assume that the distributions of users over the service area and their roaming patterns are uniform. A uniform distribution of users implies that the adoption level also measures the availability of connectivity to roaming users, hence . Similarly, uniform roaming patterns mean that roaming users (and traffic) are evenly distributed across users' home bases, i.e., all see the same connectivity while roaming. Therefore, we can write the function as
The parameter measures the utility of basic home connectivity, while reflects the utility of roaming connectivity. 3 The latter needs to be weighed by the "odds" that such connectivity is available, which are proportional to the current service coverage . Hence, is the (true) utility of roaming connectivity, when the level of coverage is . The additional factors and in (4) capture the impact of a user's roaming characteristic in how it uses, and therefore values, home and roaming connectivity. Specifically, a user with roaming characteristic splits its connectivity time in the proportions and between roaming and home connectivity, respectively.
Furthermore, the impact of roaming traffic is assumed proportional to its volume , which, based on the assumption of uniform roaming patterns, is equally distributed across adopters' home bases. Specifically, the (negative) utility associated with roaming traffic consuming resources in the home base of users is proportional to . Roaming traffic affects equally the users whose home base it uses and the roaming users seeking connectivity through it. Hence, all users experience the same impact of the form , so that is 4 Under these assumptions, a user's utility is of the form (5) In Section III, we characterize the total welfare that can be created by a UPC service as a function of the service parameters (exogenous and endogenous).
III. TOTAL WELFARE
In this section, we characterize the total welfare (value) a UPC service can create for its adopters and provider. Adopters' welfare is through the utility they derive from the service, while the provider's welfare is from what it charges adopters for the 3 The range of the values of roaming connectivity is taken to be , i.e., the value of roaming connectivity is at least as high as that of home connectivity. 4 The range of the coefficient of roaming traffic, , is taken to be , i.e., it is lower than the max roaming utility.
service. Using the model introduced in the previous section, we derive analytical conditions under which the total welfare is maximized. As argued earlier, the benefit of such analytical solutions is in providing insight into when and why the service may be valuable (worth deploying). The validity of that insight is tested under more general conditions in Section VIII.
To compute the maximum welfare, we first obtain the optimal set of adopters for any given adoption level , and then solve for the optimal .
A. Optimal Adoption Set for Given Adoption Level
For a given adoption level , we seek the set of adopters , that maximizes welfare. Provider's welfare (or profit)
can be written as (6) where is the price charged to a user with roaming characteristic given a set of existing adopters, and is the per-customer cost of providing the service, e.g., as incurred from billing, customer service, or equipment cost subsidies. 5 Conversely, users' welfare is given by (7) The service welfare, , is the sum of these two quantities (8) For notational purposes, we denote the integrand in (8) by which can be interpreted as the individual value adopter contributes to the service. Using (5), we can rewrite (8) as (9) Characterizing optimal welfare for a given adoption level , calls for identifying the set of adopters of cardinality , which maximizes (9) . This is the subject of the next lemma, which is proved in [7, Appendix I] in a more general form.
Lemma 1: For any adoption level , maximum welfare is always obtained with a set of adopters that exhibit contiguous roaming characteristics. Specifically, is of the form if if (10)
B. Optimal Adoption Level
From Lemma 1, we obtain the optimal welfare given any adoption level . Following the partition , whereas the solid black and white areas correspond to and , respectively.
of (10) into two cases and , we consider separately the cases of and . Using (10) in (3) gives for and therefore by (9), Similarly, for , the roaming traffic corresponding to is and therefore by (9) Combining the above expressions, the optimal service value for a given adoption level is given by if if where and are related by (10). Given , we can then solve for the value that maximizes . The computations are mechanical in nature and are given in [7, Appendix B], with Fig. 1 illustrating as a function of and (for ). The solution can be partitioned into two different regimes based on the value of . When (corresponding to in Fig. 1 ), optimal adoption is either or depending on the service cost . If the service cost is low , then maximum welfare occurs for , and it is (11) Conversely, if the service cost is high , then it overshadows any benefit or utility the service produces and it is impossible to create positive welfare. In this case, the "optimal" adoption is . In contrast, when (corresponding to in Fig. 1) , intermediate values are possible (the gradient-shaded region of Fig. 1 ). This is because as increases, sedentary users start to derive more utility and progressively become the dominant value contributors. Therefore a set of (mostly) sedentary adopters can make a large positive welfare contribution. Furthermore, because this value is negatively affected by roaming traffic, the optimal adoption level discourages frequently roaming users. Note that gives a tentative measure of the "net" importance of roaming (roaming utility factor less roaming traffic factor), and as such the condition describes a system where home connectivity has a higher value than the overall ("net") effect of roaming connectivity. Such a system may arguably not be a prime candidate for UPC services.
In summary, the main finding that emerges from the results of this section is that when a UPC service can generate significant positive value, that value is typically maximized at full adoption (or close to full adoption 6 ). Section VIII numerically tests the validity of this finding when the model's assumptions are relaxed.
While this section explored the relationship between service adoption and total welfare and identified adoption sets that maximize total welfare, Section IV focuses on how to realize such outcomes. As we shall see, this greatly depends on the flexibility of the pricing policy used.
IV. ROLE OF PRICING
The analysis of Section III characterizes maximum service welfare, but does not offer a constructive method to realize it. As shown in (5), adoption and, therefore, welfare, depend on . Hence, maximizing welfare calls for identifying a suitable pricing policy.
Moreover, the price is also the parameter that determines how welfare is divided between users and the provider. For example, if , then the provider is only compensated for its expenses (its profit is ) and the entire welfare is realized as user's utility, . Conversely, if , then , i.e., users derive zero utility (strictly speaking, prices would be set to ensure an infinitesimal but positive utility) and all of the welfare is realized as provider's profit, . Other pricing schemes are possible that distribute welfare between users and the provider. For example, a price of the form (12) which is an instance of a discriminatory pricing policy, leaves every user with a positive utility hence realizing the optimal adoption level 7 . Therefore, the optimal welfare of (11) is realized, and by using in (7), it follows that the users' overall welfare is This means that without affecting adoption, we can pick any to freely vary in the range , and accordingly by (8) (13) In short, this policy realizes two important goals:
• optimal welfare; • flexible welfare distribution. Such a discriminatory pricing policy is, however, difficult to implement in practice as it requires knowledge of individual user characteristics that may not be readily available, 8 and also results in a price that varies with the adoption level . This heterogeneity across both users and adoption levels is illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3 , which plot as a function of and . In the following sections, we introduce pricing policies that offer a different tradeoff between realizing maximum welfare, distributing it arbitrarily, and practicality. 7 When optimal adoption is not at , optimal welfare can still be realized by setting a high price for users who should not adopt. 8 Even if the provider has full knowledge of individual user characteristics , it may not be acceptable to charge users differently.
V. USAGE-BASED PRICING POLICY
As mentioned above, a discriminatory pricing policy can both maximize total welfare and distribute it arbitrarily between users and the provider. It is, however, difficult to implement in practice. This section proposes a usage-based pricing scheme that mimics the behavior of the discriminatory policy, but makes it feasible in practice. Under a usage-based pricing scheme, users are charged based on how often they connect at home and while roaming. We present next the structure of usage-based pricing, how it is able to capture key aspects of discriminatory pricing, and also the insight that the analysis of the pricing policy affords.
A. Pricing Structure
In a UPC service, usage has two components, home usage denoted by and roaming usage denoted by . A usage-based pricing policy may assign different prices to these two usage types. Assuming that and are unit prices for home and roaming usage, respectively, a user is charged (14) where corresponds to fixed usage allowance that may be given to each user, e.g., akin to the free minutes commonly included in cellular phone plans.
Equation (14) states what a user pays for the service as a function of her usage. Next, we express this cost in terms of the user and service model of Section II. This calls for characterizing how roaming characteristics and the service coverage affect a user's home and roaming usages.
By definition, denotes a user's propensity to roam, i.e., how often she is roaming versus at home. However, because a roaming user successfully connects only where there is coverage, her "typical" roaming usage is only . Conversely, her typical home usage is simply (home connectivity is always available). Replacing and in (14) by the typical roaming and home usages and of a user with roaming characteristics , we obtain the following expression for what she will typically be charged for using a UPC service with a coverage level of : (15) Equation (15) has three parameters , and that affect service adoption, i.e., which users derive positive utility. Given our goal of emulating the discriminatory pricing policy of (12) and by comparing it to (15), we choose and , which yields the following usage-based pricing scheme: (16) We note that the only difference between (16) and the discriminatory pricing of (12) is in the terms versus , where the former is constant while the latter depends on the level of roaming traffic . As we shall see next, this difference is minor, and the usage-based pricing policy of (16) is capable of realizing both maximum welfare and flexibility in how welfare is distributed across users and the provider.
B. Maximal Service Adoption
Using (16) in (5) gives the following expression for the utility derived by user from adopting the service: (17) We next use (17) to identify the adoption equilibria under usagebased pricing. We say a set of adopters comprises an equilibrium when if and if Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Under the usage-based pricing policy of (16), full adoption, , is the unique equilibrium if , and is not an equilibrium if . Proof: Recall that , and note that at any adoption level (corresponding to an adopters' set such that ), the roaming traffic satisfies . Hence, and (17) yields that . Consequently if . This is true for all values of and , i.e., all users have positive utility at all adoption levels. Therefore no other equilibrium can exist, since that would mean for some , and for the utility is negative, which is contradictory. This proves sufficiency.
On the other hand, if , then by (17) we have . However, at full adoption, and therefore , which means cannot be an equilibrium. This completes the proof. Proposition 1 implies that the usage-based pricing policy maximizes total welfare by realizing full adoption, 9 provided the provider sets the usage allowance higher than the threshold . The threshold's value is clearly specific to the assumptions on which the model is predicated. However, as we will see in Section VIII, such a threshold condition is present under more general settings. In particular, as long as the usage allowance is larger than a threshold , full adoption is the unique equilibrium, while if full adoption is then not an equilibrium.
We explore next the policy's ability to distribute welfare between users and the provider.
C. Welfare Distribution
From (17), the utility of user at full adoption is Combining this expression with (7) gives the overall user welfare with provider's profit given accordingly by (13) .
This means that we can pick any without affecting adoption, and therefore freely vary both and in the full range . Although, as mentioned earlier, the usage-based policy does not perfectly emulate the discriminatory policy of (12) , it coincides with it at full adoption through the change of variables . Hence, a usage-based pricing policy offers a practical solution to realize optimality and flexibility (in distributing welfare).
Those benefits notwithstanding, implementing usage-based pricing calls for monitoring (logging) usage, which incurs a cost. In addition, some users may prefer the predictability of fixed pricing (independent of usage), even in cases where it may be less advantageous for them [8] , i.e., result in a lower utility. This is particularly so in the case of home connectivity, for which fixed pricing is often the norm. For instance, Time Warner recently announced [9] that its customers would always retain the option of a flat-rate monthly pricing for broadband Internet access, with usage-based plans being optional.
For those reasons, we consider next a hybrid pricing policy that combines fixed and usage-based pricing, and evaluate the tradeoffs it imposes.
VI. HYBRID USAGE-BASED PRICING POLICY
Consider a pricing policy that combines a fixed price for home connectivity and a usage-based price for connectivity while roaming.
A. Pricing Structure
Using notation similar to Section V-A, let denote the roaming usage of a user. The total hybrid usage-based price that a user is charged is then (18) 9 Assuming that the parameters are such that total welfare is maximized at .
where the price of home usage is fixed (independent of usage) at and identical for all users, 10 and as before, is the unit usage price while roaming.
The only user-dependent term in (18) is, therefore, her roaming usage. Recalling the discussion of Section V-A, the typical roaming usage of a user with roaming profile when the service coverage is is equal to . Hence, the typical cost to a user with profile for the service is given by (19) Next, we investigate if and how and can be set to again emulate the discriminatory policy of (12) , or more importantly achieve the same outcomes, namely, maximum welfare and flexibility in allowing distribution of welfare across users and the provider. As per the discussion of Section IV, the former calls for selecting and so as to ensure full adoption, i.e., .
B. Maximal Service Adoption
Given the price structure of (19) , the utility of a user can be obtained from (5) as By applying the change of variables and can be rewritten as (20) Note that corresponds to the net residual utility for home connectivity at full adoption, and conversely is the corresponding quantity for roaming connectivity.
The next lemma provides conditions under which full adoption is an equilibrium.
Lemma 2: Under the hybrid pricing of (19), full adoption, , is an equilibrium if and only if and . Proof: At full adoption we have and . Therefore, the utility of (20) becomes For to be an equilibrium, all users must have positive utility. This implies Since this is a linear function of , the inequality holds if and only if it is satisfied for both and , i.e., and . The conditions of Lemma 2 state that full adoption, , is possible only if the fixed price for home connectivity is not too high, i.e.,
, and the roaming usage-based price is no higher than the net roaming value at full adoption, , minus the price already charged for home connectivity, i.e., . 10 Note that the usage allowance is now included in . Unlike the conditions of Proposition 1 that ensured positive utility for all users at all levels of coverage, Lemma 2 does not include such guarantees. In particular, and as illustrated in Fig. 4 for the user, the utility of a user can vary from negative to positive as coverage increases, with a crossover value of in the case of Fig. 4 . The user, therefore, adopts only once coverage exceeds 0.85. Hence, her adoption depends on the adoption of enough other users . In general, and as hinted at in Fig. 3 , users with low values have higher utility at low coverage and are therefore the ones joining the service when it is first offered. As they do, the service becomes more valuable for users with higher values, whose utility may then become positive, allowing them to adopt. This progression can, however, stall before full adoption is reached, i.e., adoption may stop at a level . This can arise even under the conditions of Lemma 2, as Lemma 2 does not guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium. As shown in [7, Appendix C] , when the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, is the unique equilibrium if and only if satisfies (21) This then ensures that adoption increases monotonically until reaching full adoption. The condition of (21) and/or need to be large enough to ensure that (21) is satisfied. Specifically, algebraic manipulation of (21) in this case yields (22) . Proposition 2 states that when is an equilibrium under hybrid pricing, it can coexist with other equilibria when the value of home connectivity utility is high enough, i.e., and the condition of (22) is not satisfied. Focusing on cases when maximizes total welfare, e.g., is low enough, this means that it is possible for the provider to set prices and (and consequently and ) for which full adoption is feasible, i.e., the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied, without ever being able to reach this target. This occurs when the provider's choice of prices allows the emergence of a second equilibrium , where adoption stops upon reaching it.
As Proposition 2 indicates, though, it is possible to avoid such outcomes by properly selecting prices (parameters and ) to comply with (22) . This is illustrated in Fig. 5 , which plots the system's final adoption as and vary for the case (initial adoption is set to , and for simplicity we assume and focus on the impact of varying ). The figure confirms (straight boundary line at in the figure) that when , any value of results in full adoption. It also shows that when , the system only converges to full adoption when further satisfies the condition of (22) (corresponding to values that lie to the right of the curved boundary line in the figure) .
The conditions of Proposition 2 are clearly specific to the assumptions on which the model is predicated. However, we will see in Section VIII that the very same behavior arises under more general settings; specifically, a second, suboptimal equilibrium can arise whenever the value of home connectivity exceeds a certain threshold, and in the process prevent the system from reaching its intended target of full adoption. In addition, overcoming this issue can again be accomplished by adjusting prices, albeit to different values than those of Proposition 2.
We note that the aspect of adjusting (lowering) prices to ensure full adoption begs the question of what would motivate the provider to do so. We explore this issue next in the broader context of the hybrid pricing policy's ability to distribute welfare between users and the provider. We first explore the pricing policy's ability to support arbitrary welfare distribution at full adoption, including maximizing the provider's profit, and then focus on the extent to which the conditions of Proposition 2 constrain this ability, and what options are available to overcome those limitations.
C. Welfare Distribution
As before, we focus on scenarios for which total welfare is maximized at full adoption, i.e., combinations that, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , correspond to a low enough cost relative to the other system's parameters and . We explore first whether, once at full adoption (and maximum total welfare), the hybrid pricing policy allows an arbitrary distribution of welfare (as the usagebased policy did), from maximum user welfare to maximum provider profit.
Lemma 2 identifies the constraints that pricing must satisfy to ensure that full adoption is an equilibrium, i.e., and . Combining (20) and (7) gives the following expression for the users' welfare at full adoption: (23) with, according to (13) and (11), the provider's profit given by (24) Realizing maximum user welfare calls for choosing prices such that , which according to (24) implies This can be readily accomplished by choosing values of and that also satisfy Lemma 2, e.g., , and , where is arbitrarily small. Conversely, maximizing the provider's profit calls for setting prices that extract (nearly) all the value users realize from the system, i.e., set both and equal to arbitrarily small positive values (this again satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2, namely, and ). Intermediate distributions of welfare are also feasible simply by adjusting the values of and . Consider for example a scenario where a regulator wants all users to see the same utility value . From (20) , the utility of a user with roaming parameter is given by Eliminating the dependency on to ensure that all users see the same utility requires , which then implies that again satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2. Hence, we see that once at full adoption (and assuming full adoption maximizes welfare), the hybrid pricing policy, like the usage-based policy, is capable of achieving any arbitrary distribution of welfare between users and the provider. However as made explicit in Proposition 2, reaching full adoption can, as reflected in (22), impose additional conditions on pricing, which may preclude some welfare distribution configurations. In particular, maximizing the provider's profit, which as just discussed calls for setting both and to arbitrarily small positive values, readily conflicts with the conditions of (22) .
A possible approach suggested by the discussion of Section VI-B is for the provider to offer an introductory pricing that satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2; thereby enabling full adoption to be reached. The motivation for the provider to do so is that once full (or nearly full 11 ) adoption has been reached, it can then switch to a pricing scheme that allows it to extract a higher profit.
In Section VII, we introduce a third family of pricing policies that seeks to eliminate all dependency on monitoring a user's usage, therefore simplifying implementation and possibly facilitating user acceptance.
VII. FIXED PRICE POLICY
This section considers a pricing policy based on a fixed price that covers both home and roaming connectivity. As mentioned earlier, the use of a fixed price is not uncommon for home connectivity, but it is arguably less so for wireless roaming access, which is the other component of the service we consider. Nevertheless, a number of wireless carriers do offer fixed-price wireless services [10] . Hence, it is of interest to investigate the impact such a pricing policy might have on their ability to maximize profit and on the welfare the system realizes.
A. Pricing Structure
Pricing is independent of usage and based on a single parameter (25) We investigate if and how can be set to realize maximum welfare and flexibility in distributing it across stakeholders. As per the discussion of Section IV, the former (typically) calls for selecting so as to ensure full adoption, i.e., .
B. Maximum Service Adoption
Given (5) and the price structure of (25) , the utility of user is (26) The following lemma then gives the condition under which full adoption is an equilibrium. The proof is in [7, Appendix D] .
Lemma 3: Under the fixed price policy of (25) , full adoption is an equilibrium if and only if . Note that as was the case with Lemma 2, the condition of Lemma 3 does not imply uniqueness of the equilibrium. In fact, as shown in [7, Appendix D] , under fixed pricing there may be as many as four equilibria, spanning combinations of stable, unstable, periodic, or chaotic equilibria. Table I summarizes possible combinations, with denoting stable equilibria; unstable equilibria; equilibria associated with an "orbit" that can be either convergent, periodic, or chaotic; and -the absence of equilibria.
Ensuring that is the unique (stable) equilibrium, and therefore that the service always reaches full adoption, calls for additional constraints on beyond those of Lemma 3. These constraints are formalized in the next proposition, which mirrors the conditions of Proposition 1 for usage-based pricing. The proof is again in [7, Appendix D] . The conditions of Proposition 3 ensure that total welfare is maximized under a fixed price policy. Next, we see if and how these conditions limit the policy's ability to distribute welfare between users and the provider.
C. Welfare Distribution
From (26), the utility of user at full adoption is which, when combined with (7), gives the following expression for user welfare: with (13) correspondingly giving the provider's profit as As before, flexibility in distributing welfare calls for being able to vary across the full range , where . Clearly, this cannot be achieved without violating the conditions of Proposition 3, e.g., calls for (recall that ). Therefore, the service is not capable of realizing full adoption and maximizing the provider's profit (see [7, Appendix D] for a full discussion).
Under hybrid pricing, we suggested the use of introductory prices to first realize full adoption, and then perform the desired welfare allocation. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient under fixed pricing, as certain welfare allocations are incompatible with not just Proposition 3, but also Lemma 3. In particular and as mentioned above, calls for a price that violates the conditions of both the lemma and the proposition. Hence, after an introductory price expires, it forces a drop in adoption below and prevents welfare maximization.
In other words, the simplicity of the fixed price policy comes at a cost in terms of its ability to simultaneously maximize and distribute welfare. The concern is that this limitation may result in suboptimal welfare realizations (and lower service coverage), as the provider may be tempted to set prices to maximize profit. Fig. 6 helps assess the extent to which this may be a risk. It plots as a function of and for a combination of parameters , and , the relative difference in profit between a profit maximizing choice of and one that yields the best possible profit while also maximizing welfare, i.e., maintaining . The figure indicates that as long as remains relatively small (compared to and ), the incentive to deviate from a welfare maximizing price is small. As a matter of fact, when is very small, maximizing profit and welfare coincide even though welfare cannot be entirely realized as profit (this is an intrinsic limitation of the fixed-price policy). As the negative impact of roaming traffic, , grows larger, it however becomes increasingly tempting (profitable) for the provider to deviate from a welfare maximizing strategy and set a price that keeps adoption low. Arguably though, such scenarios where users are highly sensitive to the (negative) impact of roaming traffic are inherently not conducive to the large-scale deployment of a UPC-like service.
The analysis of this section and its illustration in Fig. 6 are clearly dependent on the specific assumptions of the model. However, as demonstrated in Section VIII, the findings hold even under more general conditions. In summary, although the fixed price policy exhibits clear limitations in its ability to jointly maximize welfare and profit, its simplicity still makes it an attractive candidate, at least in scenarios where users are relatively insensitive to the negative aspects of a UPC service (small values). In addition and as discussed in [7, Appendix D] , setting the price to maximize profit can be "risky," as the optimal price is such that small errors in parameter estimation can produce a dramatic collapse in adoption and consequently profit. 12 This should make the safer welfare maximization policy more appealing to the service provider.
VIII. GENERALIZATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
The user adoption model reflected in the utility function of (5) is obviously highly stylized and predicated on various simplifying assumptions, namely the following.
• A user's propensity to roam, , is uniformly distributed in . 12 In other words, the underlying optimization is inherently fragile.
• A user's utility is a specific linear function of coverage and volume of roaming traffic .
• Adoption, , accurately measures coverage .
• All users see the same coverage and contribute the same amount of traffic while roaming. Similarly, the different pricing policies discussed in the paper rely on these assumptions, as well as on an implicit knowledge (by the service provider) of the range and values of the different system parameters. This clearly raises valid questions regarding whether the paper's findings hold outside this framework.
This section, and more generally [7, Appendix F] , seeks to address this issue. It numerically investigates the extent to which relaxations of modeling assumptions and the introduction of estimation errors in the system's parameters affect the results. As expected, modifying the paper's assumptions produces quantitative changes in the outcomes. However, as we show next, its main qualitative findings remain valid.
More specifically, the investigation demonstrates the robustness of the paper's findings (summarized in Section VIII-A) against a broad range of perturbations. Results are presented here only for representative scenarios, with the full set of results available in [7, Appendix F] .
The rest of this section is structured as follows. Section VIII-A restates the paper's main findings for completeness. The methodology behind the robustness tests is outlined in Section VIII-B, while an illustrative example is presented in Section VIII-C.
A. Main Findings and Insight
We briefly recall the main findings that emerged from the results of the paper's simple model.
• Maximum total welfare: Whenever the system is capable of generating value, this value is maximized at full (or close to full) adoption.
• Usage-based pricing: Realizing the system's maximum value under a usage-based pricing policy calls for ensuring that users are offered a usage allowance that exceeds a minimum threshold .
• Hybrid usage-based pricing: When the value of home connectivity is high, the hybrid pricing policy may not achieve maximum system value (because of the emergence of a suboptimal equilibrium) unless prices are sufficiently discounted (high values for parameters and ). Such discounts prevent the service provider from maximizing profit, unless it resorts to an introductory pricing scheme.
• Fixed pricing: Under a fixed price policy, profit and welfare maximization strategies typically differ unless the penalty associated with allowing roaming traffic (the parameter ) is small.
B. Robustness Testing Methodology
In testing for robustness, we consider perturbations to the assumptions, parameters, and functional expressions of the paper's model. Because those perturbations affect the model's analytical tractability, their impact is evaluated by means of numerical simulations. The simulations also consider the effect of different types of errors in the estimation of system parameters on which the service provider relies when designing pricing strategies. We describe next the dimensions along which we perturb the original model. Additional details can again be found in [7, Appendix F] .
Nonuniform roaming distributions: We consider different probability distributions for a user's propensity to roam, . In particular, we consider distributions with both low and high roaming modes (fewer or more users that roam frequently).
Modified user utility functions: The original model assumes a specific functional expression for users' utility that grows linearly with coverage and decreases linearly with the volume of roaming traffic . We relax the linearity assumption, and also consider two different utility functions inspired by the models of [11] .
Coverage saturation: The original model assumes that coverage increases linearly with service adoption. We relax this assumption and consider a saturation effect for coverage, i.e., coverage is now a concave function of adoption, which captures that adequate coverage may be realized with less than 100% adoption.
Users heterogeneity: We consider a scenario where users belong to two "types" with different "profiles." The type of a user affects that user's utility as well as the volume of roaming traffic she generates.
C. Robustness Tests
Because of space limitations, we only report on the outcome of one experiment that combines the first three perturbations of Section VIII-B, namely, a nonuniform roaming distribution with a mode toward high roaming values, a nonlinear utility function for users, 13 and coverage that increases faster than adoption, i.e., saturates before full adoption. We omit including different types of users in the experiment, as this additional perturbation typically masks the effect of the others. Results reporting on its effect can, however, be found in [7, Appendix F], together with results for different utility functions and a range of other scenarios. Fig. 7 displays the results of the evaluation. It consists of four subfigures, with each subfigure corresponding to one of the findings summarized in Section VIII-A, and illustrating the extent to which the corresponding finding has been affected. As we discuss next, the figures illustrate that while quantitative changes can be observed, the overall qualitative outcomes remain similar, thereby demonstrating the robustness of the findings. A similar conclusion held across the broader range of scenarios found in [7, Appendix F] .
Consider first Fig. 7(a) that mirrors Fig. 1, namely , plots the adoption level that maximizes total welfare as a function of the system parameters and . The figure illustrates that, as in the original model, when the system can generate positive value (the system cost is not too high), this is achieved at or near full adoption. The wider "intermediate" area that shows welfare being maximized slightly below full adoption is intuitive in light of the assumption of coverage saturation for the system, i.e., reaching full adoption adds more roaming traffic without meaningfully improving coverage. Fig. 7 (b) in turn displays that under the usage-based pricing policy, the system still exhibits the characteristic "threshold behavior," which had been identified in the original model. Specifically, the pricing policy needs to offer users a certain minimum usage allowance, , to successfully realize full adoption, and therefore maximum welfare. The exact value of is clearly different from that predicted by the original model, but the overall behavior is still present. Fig. 7 (c) corresponds to Fig. 5 . It shows that, as before, when the value of home connectivity is large, the hybrid pricing policy exhibits regimes where a suboptimal equilibrium can arise, thereby preventing the system from reaching full adoption. Overcoming this issue can again be accomplished by appropriately discounting the service prices. The discount values are obviously different, but the mechanism is the same.
Finally, Fig. 7 (d) parallels Fig. 6 . It displays for the fixed price policy the gap in profit between profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing strategies. As before, the gap is small when the parameter is small, and grows large as increases.
The above results offer evidence that the findings of the paper hold under more general settings than those of the specific and relatively simple model used to preserve analytical tractability. As mentioned earlier, further evidence of this robustness can be found in [7, Appendix F], which also investigates the impact of various errors in the provider's estimates for the different system parameters.
IX. RELATED WORKS
The service adoption process this paper focuses on exhibits both positive and negative externalities. There is a vast literature investigating the effect of externalities, often called network effects [12] - [14] , but the majority of these works focus on either positive or negative externalities separately. For example, [5] investigates the impact of positive externalities on the product adoption decisions of individuals. The effect of positive externalities on the competition between technologies is considered in [15] - [20] . Conversely, the impact of negative externalities, e.g., from congestion, has been extensively investigated in the context of pricing for both communication networks [21] - [25] and transportation systems [26] - [29] .
The topic of optimal pricing for systems with both positive and negative externalities is less studied and seems to have been first addressed in [30] , which sought to optimize a combination of provider's profit and consumers' surplus. Different pricing strategies were considered, including flat pricing and pricing strategies that account for the product "amount" consumed by a user, i.e., akin to the usage-based pricing model of Section V. Other works have been primarily conducted in the context of the theory of clubs first formally introduced in [31] (see [32] - [34] for more recent discussions). A club has a membership that shares a common good or facility, e.g., a swimming pool, so that increases in membership have a positive effect (externality) by lowering the cost share of the common good, e.g., lower maintenance costs of the shared swimming pool. At the same time, a larger membership also has a negative, congestion-like effect, e.g., a more crowded swimming pool. In general, the coexistence of positive and negative externalities implies an optimal membership size (see also [35] for a recent interesting investigation that contrasts the outcomes of self-forming and managed memberships).
Club-like behaviors also manifest themselves in file-sharing peer-to-peer (p2p) systems. In a file-sharing p2p system, more peers increase the total resources available to store content. However, unless enough peers are willing to share their resources, more peers can also translate into a higher load on those peers willing to serve files to others and/or a longer time for locating a desired file. This has then triggered the investigation of incentive mechanisms to ensure that enough peers share their resources, e.g., BitTorrent "tit-for-tat" mechanism [36] or [37] , which also explores a possible application to a wireless access system similar in principle to the one considered in this paper.
The model of this paper differs from these earlier works in important ways. First and foremost, it introduces a model for individual adoption decisions of a service, which allows for heterogeneity in the users' valuation of the service. In particular, certain users (roaming users) have a strong disincentive to adoption when coverage/penetration is low, while others (sedentary users) are mostly insensitive to this factor. Conversely, this heterogeneity is also present in the negative externality associated with an increase in service adoption. Its magnitude is a function of not just the number of adopters, but their identity as well, i.e., roaming or sedentary users. The presence of heterogeneity in how users value the service and how they affect its value is a key aspect of a UPC-like service; one that influences its value and how to price it to realize this value.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper was motivated by the emergence of UPC services that feature both positive and negative externalities, and more importantly (negative) externalities that depend not just on the number of adopters, but also on which users have adopted. The goal was to develop an understanding of the conditions under which such services may succeed and the welfare they generate.
As expected, given the service's strong positive externality, welfare is typically maximized when adoption is maximum. More interestingly, maximum adoption and welfare can be achieved through relatively simple pricing policies that also afford complete flexibility in deciding how welfare is distributed between users and the provider of the service. Of interest is the fact that pricing according to service usage is sufficient to capture differences in how users value the service and successfully realize both maximum welfare and arbitrary welfare distribution.
Despite the relative simplicity of usage-based pricing, it involves monitoring overhead and may face acceptance challenges on the part of users. This motivated the investigation of alternate policies, which offer a different tradeoff between implementation considerations, welfare maximization, and flexibility in welfare distribution. The paper's main contributions are in offering new insight into the viability of UPC-like services, as well as simple (pricing) mechanisms to facilitate their successful and effective deployment.
